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Abstract. At a given level of technology the gross aggregate production function lies above the net 
aggregate production function where the difference represents the aggregate transaction costs in the 
economy. Transitional economies facing serious institutional impediments to creating a smoothly func-
tioning market mechanism are faced with sizable transaction costs. We use a net production function 
model enhanced by Furubotn and Richter and apply it conceptually to the case of transitional econo-
mies. We find that at a particular level of a community isoprofit line much less output will be supplied 
compared to developed market economies with mature market institutions. The aim of the paper is 
to trace the falling output and the deep structural problems of East European economies to the effect 
of transaction costs and institutional building. The more rapidly transaction costs grow, the less the 
firms would be willing to pay for inputs. Furthermore, we find that certain markets tend to disappear 
in emerging economies due to the adverse effects of transaction costs. As a safeguard to precontractual 
opportunism and prevention to ex post transaction costs, ex ante transaction costs would play a more 
vital role in East European societies.
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introduction
Coase (1937) introduces the term transaction costs in his pathbreaking work “The 
Nature of the Firm.” He uses the concept of transaction costs to explain the existence of 
firms as alternatives to market organization. Then in “The Problem of Social Cost” Coase 
(1960) examines two situations involving interfering businesses: that of the ideal world 
of zero transaction costs and that of the real world of nonzero transaction costs. Coase 
uses zero transaction costs merely to illustrate the meaning and effect of transaction 
costs in reality. He (1988, p. 174) believes that the real costs of using the market 
mechanism are nonzero and regrets the fact that zero, rather than positive, transaction 
costs have received so much attention in the academic world (Coase, 1994). Williamson 
(1979) also claims that there are and always will be transaction costs. According to 
Williamson (1989, p. 227), Coase uses the zero-transaction cost condition merely for 
reference purposes and not only do all transactions incur some transaction costs but, 
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more importantly, the costs of governing contractual relations differ among the different 
forms of economic organization. The comparative institutional analysis of economic 
organization is meaningful only with positive transaction costs. They are important 
because they explain the different modes of economic organization. Eggertsson (1999, 
p. 102), Furubotn & Richter (2000, p. 85) also believe that transaction costs are positive 
in the real world.
Once positive transaction costs are introduced in economic analysis, obtaining 
market information becomes costly and individuals are boundedly rational 
(Williamson, 1979, 1985). Their ability to acquire information is limited, which 
causes their knowledge of the market system to be only partial. The concept of positive 
transaction costs becomes of primary importance in societies where the costs of 
transacting are prohibitively high and institutional backwardness blocks the functioning 
of the market mechanism. A group of scholars emphasizes just these negative effects of 
transaction costs on economic development. In his article “The Market for ‘Lemons’: 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, Akerlof (1970) describes well the 
mechanisms by which transaction costs, asymmetric information and contractual 
opportunism extinguish markets. Prior to him Banfield (1958) argues that lack of 
trust is one of the causes of economic underdevelopment. Eggertsson (1999, p. 40) 
believes that negotiation costs and other transaction costs may block the reassignment 
of rights. Thus, how property rights are defined may have important consequences for 
the aggregate output of an economy and can affect an entire macroeconomic system 
leading it to growth or stagnation.
Some new institutionalists study political transaction costs, i.e., the “costs of running 
and adjusting of the institutional framework of the polity” (Furubotn & Richter, 2000, 
p. 43). These are the costs of sustaining the formal and informal political organization 
of a system as well as of running a polity. They arise in the context of law and represent 
the costs of running the state as a social arrangement. In contrast to them are market 
transaction costs, the costs of search and information, bargaining and enforcement, 
using the market. When political transaction costs exceed the costs of using the market, 
the latter would be a preferable way of allocating resources. When the market transaction 
costs are greater than the costs of centralized control and decision-making, then the 
state becomes a preferable instrument (Coase, 1960).
A group of economists discuss transaction costs in the context of economic 
transition. Glaeser et al. (2001, p. 854) analyze the transaction cost effects and efficiency 
of the court system in Eastern Europe. To minimize the costs of market transacting and, 
thus, enforce property rights, judges must be able, and more importantly willing, to 
read, verify and interpret complicated contracts. Glaeser et al. (2001) find that in many 
emerging markets courts are underfinanced, unmotivated, unclear as to the applications 
of law, unfamiliar with economic issues, and even corrupt. The lack of resources or 
incentives to enforce the law often leads to the postponement of decisions in cases 
of noncompliance or a complete lack of justice. In studying the process of transition 
new institutionalists like Furubotn & Richter (2000, p. 22) find that disregard for 
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the relationship between political processes and economic development by western 
economic advisors is the reason for the slow transformation of the post-communist 
economies. Riker & Weimer (1995, p. 94) suggest that emerging economies face severe 
problems in establishing the credibility of their systems of property rights due to the 
unpredictability of government policy and the lack of deep understanding of the role 
that private property plays in market economies. In his Nobel Prize lecture Coase 
(1991) concludes that the attempts to establish a market economy in Eastern Europe 
make clear the importance of institutional factors. “These ex-communist countries are 
advised to move to a market economy, and their leaders wish to do so, but without 
the appropriate institutions no market economy of any significance is possible” (Coase, 
1991)1. Coase (1991) thinks that the West would have done a better job advising the 
emerging market economies if it knew more about its own economy.
We could imagine that there may be economic sectors or activities where transaction 
costs are negligible so that private bargaining is easy in the ideal “Coasian” world of 
zero transaction costs. But what matters more for economic analysis are situations of 
prohibitively high transaction costs, i.e., activities or societies in which transaction costs 
are so remarkably high that they cause the disappearance of some markets and block the 
economic development of some countries. While there may be societies and economies 
where transaction costs are negligible, individuals in East European societies are more 
prone to limited information, bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty than 
the citizens of western developed countries, their knowledge of the economic system 
being much more limited.
We have studied the roots of transaction costs in transitional economies previously 
(Todorova, 2004, 2007). We trace those roots to the opportunistic behavior of economic 
agents at the time of socialism when opportunism was inherent in the large socialist firm. 
Furthermore, transaction costs originate from the fact that newly emerging democracies 
have to build their markets from scratch. In socialism there was no market but just one 
centralized state-owned firm. The market mechanism that transitional economies have 
recently adopted resembles new machinery that has not been tested and experiences 
strong friction. It is this friction that hampers the economic development of East 
European societies and that represents transaction costs.
In this paper we shall argue that the dramatically high transaction costs in transitional 
economies lead to a lower net aggregate output than in their western counterparts. 
Transitional economies facing serious institutional impediments to market exchange 
experience sizable transaction costs that lead to a substantial divergence between the 
gross and the net aggregate production function at a particular level of technology. The 
less efficient the coordination of economic activities in society and the higher the costs 
of using the market mechanism, the lower the net output supplied in the economy. 
1 In addition, Coase (1991) states: “It makes little sense for economists to discuss the process of 
exchange without specifying the institutional setting within which the trading takes place since this 
affects the incentives to produce and the costs of transacting. I think this is now beginning to be 
recognized and has been made crystal-clear by what is going on in Eastern Europe today.”
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The aim of the paper is to relate the lower output and the deep structural problems of 
East European economies to the effect of transaction costs and institutional build-up. 
Production is hampered, on the one hand, by a lower technological level and, on the 
other, by high transaction costs. The prescriptions of classical economics on efficiency 
and general market equilibrium do not work in East Europe and new institutional 
economics helps explain the impediments to its economic development. Furthermore, 
we argue that ceteris paribus firms in Eastern Europe would tend to pay less for inputs 
as a result of higher transaction costs. Finally, the breakdown of transaction costs 
into ex ante and ex post transaction costs and their role in high-transaction cost and 
low-transaction cost societies seem to show that ex ante safeguards that prevent 
precontractual opportunism in commercial transactions are more important in the East 
European case.
The paper starts with introduction and literature review. Part 1 discusses the 
“transaction” firm in the context of the activity “transaction” as an analog to the activity 
“production.” Part 2 shows the difference in gross and net production output resulting 
from transaction costs at the firm level. Part 3 expands the analysis to high- and low-
transaction costs economies. Part 4 discusses the role of ex ante and ex post transaction 
costs in the two types of economies. The paper ends with a conclusion.
1. The transaction firm
In their model of the transaction firm Furubotn & Richter (2005, p. 65) equate the 
activity “transaction” to the activity “production” in its conventional classical meaning.2 
A given commodity can be traded between a producer and a consumer. In order to 
identify each other, conclude the deal, monitor and enforce the agreement the two 
parties incur transaction costs the amount of which is measured in a net loss of that 
commodity. Similar to the classical production function the activity “transaction” may 
be presented by a “transaction function.”
)( PC YFY = ,
where the transaction output depends on the production function and, therefore, 
replicates its form. PY  is the amount of the goods promised to be delivered by the 
producer, while CY  is the amount promised to be accepted by the consumer.
The distance OA is the amount of the commodity sold by the producer or the 
“transaction input.” The consumer does not receive this entire amount, only the distance 
AB or the “transaction output.” The distance DB then represents the transaction costs 
and can be noted as CP YYK −=  where OC = CD = AB and DB = BC – AB = K. If 
positive transaction costs are assumed, the transaction function must lie below the 
2 Furubotn & Richter (2005) refer to Foley (1970), who includes transaction costs in the standard 
model of perfect competition by adding the activity “transaction” to the system as if it is equivalent 
to the activity “production.” 
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45o line. There will be zero transaction costs, if B  coincides with D  (the transaction 
function is on the 45o line) and DB = 0. Alternatively, if the transaction function 
intersects the 45o line, transaction costs must be negative, which is an improbable 
situation. As transaction costs are positive in the real world, some of the transaction 
input is always wasted and the transaction output is less than the input.
The slope of the transaction function gives the marginal product of the transaction 
process. It shows how many additional units of output the consumer will receive when 
the producer supplies an additional unit of input. As the volume of trade increases, the 
marginal product MP
P
C
Y
YP
∂
∂=  of the transaction process decreases (the slope of the 
transaction function falls). This declining slope of the transaction function shows that 
transaction output increases more slowly than transaction input, which is the result 
of the increasing transaction costs. The more transactions take place, the higher the 
transaction costs and the greater the divergence between transaction input and output. 
Furubotn & Richter (2005) maintain that this situation could occur if, from a certain 
point onward, buyers and sellers have to search harder for exchange possibilities and 
monitor transactions with increasing care as the total volume of transactions increases. 
“Increased monitoring and enforcement effort may be needed so that the parties to the 
exchange can guard against opportunistic behavior, which may arise from either side of 
the contract” (Furubotn & Richter, 2005, p. 66). It should be noted also that the higher 
the transaction costs, the greater the distance between the transaction function and the 
45o line of zero transaction costs and the lower the transaction function would lie below 
the 45o line. For East European firms the transaction function would lie much lower 
than the 45o line in comparison to that of western transaction firms whose transaction 
function would lie close to the latter. Hence, MP 
P
C
Y
YMP
∂
∂=  is smaller for the East 
European transaction firm, which means that for a higher increase in the transaction 
input PY  there will be a smaller increase in the transaction output CY . Much more of 
the commodity will be wasted in the form of transaction costs.
FIGURE 1. The Transaction Function
Source: Furubotn & Richter (2005)
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Let’s assume that the activity transaction is performed by the transaction firm, which 
buys a given commodity from the producer at a price PP  and sells it to the consumer 
at a price CP . The firm is trying to maximize its profit R  subject to the transaction 
function:
Max PPCC YPYPR −=  Subject to )( PC YFY =
Solving:
Max [ ])( PCPPCC YFYYPYPZ −+−= λ
0
0
0)(
=
∂
∂−−=
=+=
=−=
P
PY
CY
PC
Y
FPZ
PZ
YFYZ
P
C
λ
λ
λ
From the last two equations:
C
PP
P
C
Y
Y
F
Y
P
P
∂
∂=
∂
∂=
Alternatively,
C
P
P
C
P
P
Y
Y =
∂
∂
Because the transaction function lies below the 45o line, then it must be that
1<
∂
∂
P
C
Y
Y
If follows that
1<
C
P
P
P  and CP PP < , respectively.
We can conclude that the price which the transaction firm will pay the producer 
for obtaining the commodity will necessarily be lower than the price it will charge the 
consumer. The difference can be attributed to transaction costs. We also find that for a 
profit-maximizing transaction firm the slope of the transaction function or the marginal 
product of the transaction process  MP
P
C
Y
YP
∂
∂=  will always be positive (due to the two 
positive prices PP  and CP ) but less than 1 and, hence, the concave curvature of the 
transaction function, which again can be attributed to the presence of transaction costs. 
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There exists an optimal amount of the activity “transaction” that would maximize the 
profits to the transaction firm.
Studying the profit-maximizing behavior of the transaction firm we can observe that 
some highest isoprofit line must be tangent to the transaction function at the profit-
maximizing point q*, as can be seen from Figure 2. For the East European transaction 
firm the fact that MP 
P
C
Y
YP
∂
∂=  is very small shows that the price CP  that the consumer 
is being charged is substantially higher than the price PP  the producer will receive for 
the input. In the transitional context consumers and producers tend to bear the burden 
of transaction costs. Furthermore, having a lower transaction function the transitional 
transaction firm will likely achieve less profit than its western counterpart producing at a 
higher isoprofit line. At the optimum it will supply much less output than if transaction 
costs were lower. This effect will be demonstrated in greater detail in the next section 
of the paper.
If there are decreasing returns to scale of the activity “transaction,” there exists 
an optimal size for the individual transaction firm. Similar to the production firm 
it will have its optimal size at some volume of operations where long-run costs of 
transacting are minimal. Left of that point will be the section of diminishing returns 
to scale where the transaction firm should pursue greater scale to achieve economies. 
Right of the optimum the firm should reduce the number of transactions to avoid 
diseconomies of scale. The model ignores the transaction costs incurred by the 
transaction firm when obtaining the commodity from the producer as well as the 
costs faced by the producer himself. It shows only transferring the goods from the 
producer to the consumer.
2. Transaction costs and the individual firm
The activity “transaction” could be integrated into the production firm, the household 
or the consumer. To find the effect of transaction costs on the activity of the production 
firm we need to subtract them from the gross product achieved by the firm at a given 
level of technology. Thus we obtain the net production function, which would lie below 
FIGURE 2. Profit-maximizing Transaction Activity
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the gross production function. If by x  we denote the input and by y  the gross output, 
output is a function of input given by )(xy .
The net production function accounting for transaction costs is )(xt . That of gross 
production )(xy  lies above it. The distance between the two represents the loss of 
output due to transaction costs at each particular volume of operations. If, for example, 
the producer wishes to obtain AB amount of output, he needs to use OA amount of 
input. The difference between the gross production function and the net production 
function will be the transaction costs BC. We see that although a lot is produced (the 
entire amount AC), very little remains at the end. Much is lost to transaction costs.
It is worth noting that both slopes are positive, that is, 0>=
∂
∂
PMPx
y  and 
0>=
∂
∂
TMPx
t . The first term shows the slope of the gross production function )(xy  
or the gross marginal product; the second one shows the slope of the net production 
function )(xt  or the net marginal product. Both the gross marginal product and the net 
marginal product are positive showing that gross and net output increase with input. 
However, MPP > MPT  which shows that gross output increases faster than net output 
the difference stemming from the presence of transaction costs, which increase with 
input. That is to say, that for total transaction costs )(xT  we have 0>=
∂
∂
TMCx
T  or 
marginal transaction costs are positive and increasing input and the scale of economic 
activities increase transaction costs. Put differently, output tends to increase more 
slowly with input when transaction costs are positive and increasing. The objective of 
the firm then is to maximize its net profit: 
Max  p = pt(x) – C(x) = py(x) – C(x) – T(x)
where )(xC  are the total production costs and )(xT  shows the total transaction costs 
in monetary terms. As was already assumed, a particular output level )(xy  is associated 
with a given input level x . Output is sold at a price p . At the optimum,
FIGURE 3. The Gross and Net Production Functions
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0=
∂
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∂
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x
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0=−−
∂
∂=
∂
∂
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where the total marginal cost is the sum of the marginal production cost MCP and the 
marginal transaction cost MCT. Then it must be that the value of the marginal product 
x
ypVMP
∂
∂=  equals the total marginal cost at the optimum.
Let us now consider a case of constant average production costs where total 
production costs depend linearly on the level of input, i.e., C(x) = cx, where c  is average 
production cost.
p = py(x) – cx – T(x)
Then at the optimum we have
0=
∂
∂−−
∂
∂=
∂
∂
x
Tc
x
yp
x
π
x
T
x
ypc
∂
∂−
∂
∂=
where 
x
y
∂
∂  gives the marginal production product MPP and x
T
∂
∂  gives the marginal 
transaction cost MCT and both  MPP and MCT are positive. We obtain
c = pMPP – MCT = VMPP – MCT                 (1)
It follows that in the world of positive transaction costs the firm would pay a smaller 
price for an input than if transaction costs were assumed to be zero. In transitional 
economies where the marginal transaction cost is higher and total transaction costs 
grow faster firms would opt to pay a lower price for the input. At the same time in 
developed market economies even a more substantial increase in the level of input 
would not increase total transaction costs very much so the marginal transaction 
cost would tend to zero. The firms would value inputs at the level of the value of the 
marginal product in a classical zero transaction cost situation. Because the marginal 
transaction costs can be prohibitively high and may exceed the gross value of the 
marginal product, firms will be reluctant to hire any of the input. Equation (1) only 
makes sense when
VMPP > MCT
C CT
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The firm will not demand any input when VMPP < MCT. This example illustrates 
that optimum production decisions within the firm differ in the world of classical 
economics and that of positive transaction costs. In reality the firm would never pay 
the gross value of the marginal product of its input PVMP . It would tend to pay less 
for an input the faster the transaction costs of economic activity grow. It will pay more, 
the more slowly those costs increase. The net value of the marginal product TVMP  is 
the difference between the gross value of the marginal production product and the 
marginal transaction costs and is illustrated by Figure 4.
3. transaction costs and the aggregate production function
At the individual firm level the model shows firms or market situations where the transaction 
costs outweigh productive efficiency. For example, one firm may be less productive in 
gross terms but much more efficient in transaction, i.e., net terms. With the same level of 
technology it may achieve greater final output due to reduced transaction costs.
At the aggregate level the model illustrates societies at different levels of 
institutional development and economic efficiency. Sizable transaction costs offset 
the benefits of exchange in some countries. At a particular level of technology the 
net aggregate production function lies below the gross production function showing 
the size of the transaction costs. It will lie further below the production function when 
aggregate transaction costs are sizable in the economy and when the coordination of 
economic activities is less efficient. Furubotn & Richter (2005, p. 69) point to poor 
legislation as an example of such inefficiency in governmental activity. Although two 
economic systems or countries may have the same level of technological knowledge, 
their governments may not be equally efficient, which will result in different net 
production functions. The one with the more efficient government will enjoy greater 
net output at any respective level of input. The transaction costs in question may be 
political transaction costs, the costs of setting up, maintaining and changing the formal 
and informal political organization of a system as well as the costs of running a polity. 
But the difference between gross and net aggregate output may also result from high 
costs in private bargaining, i.e., from high market transaction costs. 
FIGURE 4. Demand for an Input with and without Transaction Costs
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Transaction costs do matter and may offset what was achieved with the help of 
production efficiency. Their importance is most vivid in the case of complete market 
failure when transaction costs are so high they prevent market exchange. The high costs 
of using the market can be overcome by the formation of hierarchies within which it 
is less costly to organize economic activities. The managerial costs of running a firm 
might be lower than the transaction costs of using the market and the firm becomes an 
alternative to the market. A problem for East European economies has been that both 
market and intrafirm or managerial transaction costs seem to be excessively high and 
economic activity can be organized neither through the market, nor through the firm. 
In the extreme case of excessive transaction costs the state as a superfirm or a firm of 
a special kind can be the best way to organize economic activities and economize on 
transaction costs. The transaction costs of obtaining some commodities through the 
market are so high that the sum of the transaction and production costs completely 
discourages consumers from demanding those commodities. High transaction costs 
hinder and in many cases completely block the economic development of countries in 
transition.
In Figure 5 )(1 xy  and )(1 xt  show the gross and net aggregate production functions 
of an advanced, low-transaction cost economy, respectively. Analogously, )(2 xy  and 
)(2 xt  are the gross and net aggregate production functions of a transition economy 
facing a lower level of technological development but higher transaction costs. The 
technological advancement and productive efficiency of the advanced economy is 
visible from the fact that its aggregate production function )(1 xy  lies above that of 
the economy in transition )(2 xy . Outdated technology and inefficient organization of 
production contribute to the much smaller gross aggregate output of the transitional 
economy. Furthermore, institutional impediments and significant transaction costs 
yield much less net output in transitional economies.
Both types of economies face positive transaction costs and their net production 
functions lie below their respective gross production function. But the net production 
FIGURE 5. Gross and Net Aggregate Production Function in Low- and  
High-Transaction Cost Economies
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function )(2 xt  of the transition economy lies much below that of the advanced economy. 
The difference between the gross and net production function is much greater for the 
transitional, high-transaction cost economy than for its advanced, low-transaction cost 
counterpart. This shows a greater loss to transaction costs in the transitional economy. The 
difference in aggregate output can be directly traced to the lack of stable and developed 
market institutions in Eastern Europe as the formal and informal rules of transacting. 
If mutual trust and ethical behavior prevailed in business relations in the region, the 
difference in the gross aggregate output and the technological level might have been 
offset by low costs of transacting. In addition to that, the legacy of public property as 
the prevailing type of property in transitional economies in the past contributes to the 
lack of proper incentives for knowledge accumulation. Private, rather than public, state-
owned property provides economic agents with a direct incentive to improve efficiency 
and productivity and to acquire more knowledge and new techniques of production.
The net aggregate production functions of a low- and high-transaction cost economy 
look very different. At the same level of input x  the advanced economy produces much 
more net output than the transitional economy. The optimum amount would depend 
on some highest community isoprofit line for both societies.
The slope of the community isoprofit line is given by the average input price c  
in the economy over the average unit price level of the aggregate output p  where 
x
p
c
p
xt += π)( . Thus for the low-transaction cost, high-output economy we obtain 
x
p
c
p
xt += 11 )(
π
 whereas for the high-transaction cost, low-output economy the 
isoprofit equation is x
p
c
p
xt += 22 )(
π . For the same level of input and output prices 
in the two economies at the optimum where some highest isoprofit line touches the 
surface of the net aggregate production function one country will produce more than 
the other. Notice that the optimum for the transitional economy at the same slope of the 
FIGURE 6. Optimal Output Levels in a Low- and a High-transaction Cost Economy
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isoprofit line occurs at output, which is substantially smaller than that in an advanced 
economy facing lower transaction costs. The isoprofit line at which the transitional 
economy is producing is lower than the isoprofit line at which the advanced economy is 
producing. This shows that firms in the transitional economy achieve much lower profit 
so 21 ππ > . Consequently, less of it will be invested in future production and the return 
on investment will be smaller. We can conclude that transaction costs reduce not only 
aggregate output of an economy but also the profits of firms in that economy.
If the economic development of a country is to be stimulated, attention must be 
paid to both production and organizational technique. The lack of legislation reducing 
transaction costs may offset any improvement based on technical progress and hence lead 
to the discouragement of economic activity. Legislation reducing transaction costs may 
increase total productivity in an economy despite the lack of substantial technological 
improvements. On the other hand, countries experiencing high transaction costs and 
having difficulty changing their legislation, should rely more heavily on the achievements 
of technological progress to compensate for the institutional impediments to market 
exchange. While it is true that institutional effectiveness is a better road to pursue, 
countries, which are not successful in bringing down transaction costs and creating a 
more efficient market economy, should rely on innovation in productive technology or 
product development. Yet, institutional reform is crucial to the transformation of East 
European economies into more productive systems of market capitalism.
4. Ex ante and ex post transaction costs
The comparative analysis of different types of economies can further be expanded 
to the study of the role that ex ante and ex post transaction costs play in the different 
economies. Theoretically, ex ante transaction costs are those of ensuring, defining and 
protecting property rights prior to concluding the contract. To Williamson (1985, p. 20) 
the ex ante costs are those of “drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement.” 
The parties draft a complex document where numerous contingencies are recognized 
and appropriate adaptations are stipulated and agreed to in advance.
Ex ante transaction costs act as safeguards against precontractual opportunism, which 
may largely be the result of asymmetric information in sales contracts. Transaction costs 
are incurred prior to signing the contract because parties, pursuing their own interest, 
may not be wholly trustworthy. The more informed party may take advantage of the 
less informed party by giving incomplete or distorted information. Akerlof (1970) 
explains the grounds for ex ante opportunism in his “lemon” model. Examples of ex 
ante opportunism are sellers who misrepresent low-quality used cars as high quality 
products to potential buyers or job seekers misrepresenting their true abilities to a 
potential employer. The problems that arise at the precontractual phase are more of 
the principle-agent model of adverse selection where the principal cannot observe the 
qualities of the individual agent. Thus ex ante transaction costs would very much be 
oriented to detecting deviation from the claimed quality or promised performance and 
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would represent resources dedicated to measuring the right quality prior to signing the 
contract. According to Barzel (1985, p. 8), resources are devoted to cheating and to 
its prevention, which distinguishes real outcome from that obtained in the Walrasian 
world.
The ex post transaction costs, on the other hand, represent the costs of enforcing, 
monitoring and observing a contract that has already been signed. Williamson 
(1985, p. 21) distinguishes between several types of ex post transaction costs: 1) the 
maladaptation costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment, 2) the haggling 
costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments, 3) the setup 
and running costs associated with the governance structures to which disputes are 
referred, and 4) the bonding costs of effecting secure commitments. Postcontractual 
opportunism does not stem so much from asymmetric information but rather from the 
presence of high specificity to a transaction such as physical asset specificity, dedicated 
assets, site specificity or human-capital specificity. A demonstration of postcontractual 
opportunism is the holdup problem when one party to a transaction captures some or 
all of the quasi rent of the party with the greater specific investment or when parties 
fall hostages to their contractual relationship (Williamson, 1985, p. 79). The superior 
party can ex post change the ex ante agreed-upon distribution of the quasi rent from the 
transaction exercising power in the contractual relationship. Furubotn & Richter (2005, 
p. 187) equate ex post opportunism to redistributional power – “the expropriation of 
the ex ante agreed-upon share of the value added.”
Williamson emphasizes that ex ante and ex post costs of contracting are interdependent 
and must be addressed simultaneously rather than sequentially. In particular, transactions 
that are subject to ex post opportunism will benefit from appropriate safeguards designed 
ex ante (Williamson, 1985, p. 48). We can hypothetically break down total transaction 
costs into ex ante and ex post transaction costs expressed by the sum
[ ]xxTTxTxT ),()()( 121 +=
where )(1 xT  are ex ante transaction costs that depend on the level of input such that 
01 >
∂
∂
x
T . This implies that the greater the input, the higher would be the ex ante 
transaction costs of safeguarding the deal. These are safeguards against precontractual 
opportunism as a function of the level of input. Ex post transaction costs [ ]2 1( ),T T x x  
depend positively on the level of input and negatively on the ex ante transaction costs. 
The first effect illustrates the influence of postcontractual opportunism that appears to 
be stronger the higher the stake of each party and the input in the transaction. Therefore, 
02 >
∂
∂
x
T , where ex post opportunism reflects the noncompliance of the parties with the 
stipulated terms of the contract after it has been concluded. The second effect shows the 
interrelation between ex ante and ex post costs where the effect of safeguards prior to the 
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conclusion of the deal is to secure its enforcement and monitoring post fact. In other 
words, ex ante transaction costs have the effect of reducing ex post transaction costs so 
that 0
1
2 <
∂
∂
T
T . We try to study the overall effect of transaction costs on the price the firm 
would pay for an input and analyse how the firm behavior would vary in developed and 
transitional market economies. We obtain
p = py(x) – cx – T1(x) – T2[T1(x), x]
At the optimum
021
1
21 =
∂
∂−
∂
∂
∂
∂−
∂
∂−−
∂
∂=
∂
∂
x
T
x
T
T
T
x
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x
yp
x
π
Expressing the optimal price the firm would pay for an input, given the presence of 
ex ante and ex post transaction costs,
x
T
x
T
T
T
x
T
x
ypc
∂
∂−
∂
∂
∂
∂−
∂
∂−
∂
∂= 21
1
21
1 2 2
1
1T T Tyc p
x x T x
 ∂ ∂ ∂∂= − + − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
                  (2)
As was already discussed, the result with positive transaction costs differs from 
that of zero transaction costs when the firm would pay more for a given input used in 
a production process. It is clear that the effect of ex post opportunism shown by the 
last term in the equation is to reduce the price the firm would pay for an input. The 
greater the amount of the input, the higher the degree of ex post opportunism and hence 
the greater the ex post transaction costs. Comparing advanced economies with newly 
emerging markets, experiencing stronger opportunism and higher ex post transaction 
costs, brings to the conclusion that ceteris paribus the price of the inputs firms tend to 
buy would be lower in transitional economies.
What is the effect of the second term in the equation? Clearly, the higher volume 
of operations increases the ex ante transaction costs similar to ex post transaction costs. 
At the same time, as was noted, ex ante transaction costs aim to reduce ex post risks 
so the higher the ex ante transaction costs, the lower the ex post transaction costs. 
How does this effect work in developed and transitional economies? In developed 
economies even larger levels of input would not stimulate serious increases in the size 
of ex ante transaction costs. Because the increase in ex ante transaction costs would be 
minimal, the reduction in ex post transaction cost would be furthermore small where 
the term 
1
2
T
T
∂
∂  shows the cost reduction effect. There would be a relatively small ex post 
transaction cost reduction effect in developed western countries.
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At the same time in transitional economies the importance of the ex ante transaction 
costs would be high. Even minor increases in the input levels would stimulate higher ex 
ante transaction costs. They can further be associated with a greater reduction in the 
level of ex post transaction costs thus compensating for future opportunism. If the effect 
of ex ante transaction costs is significantly large, it may offset the cost increasing effect of 
a higher input, ideally leading to the second term in the equation being positive. Thus ex 
ante transaction costs may outweigh the effect of ex post transaction costs. While ex ante 
transaction costs would have a minor role in developed market economies experiencing 
weaker opportunism, ex ante transaction costs would be vital in emerging market 
economies. Parties to commercial contracts would rely much more heavily on ex ante 
safeguards prior to the deal against future opportunism and moral hazard after the deal. 
This analysis also helps to explain the relative similarities between input prices in the 
two types of economies although the similar results are achieved by different transaction 
costs mechanisms, the ex ante transaction costs playing a much more important role in 
the emerging markets. We illustrate the various effects from equation (2) in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Partial Effects on Ex Ante and Ex Post Transaction Costs
x
T
∂
∂ 1
1
2
T
T
∂
∂
x
T
∂
∂ 2
Developed economies Small Small Small
Transitional economies Large Large Large
We have previously studied empirically some sectors in emerging market economies 
that demonstrate high transaction costs of market dealings, opportunism and lack of trust 
stemming from the high degree of asset specificity in those sectors. More specifically, 
in an empirical study on the Bulgarian pharmaceutical sector we have shown that the 
strong opportunism on the part of pharmacies and distribution chains has led the major 
pharmaceutical companies in the country to try to acquire those and seek schemes by 
which to circumvent the prohibitive laws on vertical integration. As an example of a 
high asset specificity, high-transaction cost sector in an emerging market the Bulgarian 
pharmaceutical industry has turned into a potentially good host for vertical integration 
(Todorova, 2010).
5. conclusion
There is a huge discrepancy in the aggregate output produced in developed and 
transitional economies stemming from the presence of significantly large transaction 
costs in transitional economies. At the same technological level a country facing strong 
opportunism in market dealings and lacking transaction cost reducing institutions 
can supply much less output. We have shown that firms in such an economy achieve 
much smaller profits. They are likely to invest less in the future, pay less for inputs and 
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receive a lower price for their output as a final result. This way transaction costs block 
the economic development of newly emerging market economies lacking commercial 
customs, practices and formal rules of the market game. We show that with excessively 
high transaction costs market demand for inputs approaches zero thus leading input 
markets into a low-end equilibrium. As a means to prevent ex post transaction costs 
stemming from postcontractual opportunism ex ante transaction costs play a stronger 
role in high-transaction cost economies than in low-transaction cost economies. 
Efficiency enhancing institutions and higher levels of technology become a priority in 
their economic development.
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